Month: November 2022

Hong Kong has long held a unique place on the global stage, operating as a liminal space between the East and the West. As a holding of the British Empire all the way up to 1997, Hong Kong has had the experimental status of a purely capitalist actor in a socialist region (that is, before China had fully embraced its “going out” policy). Since that handoff, much has changed for native Hong Kongers.

Of course, the change did not happen overnight. The Hong Kong Basic Law was to keep a British-style government in place for 50 years after the handoff. And for a few years, it did. Hong Kong held a solid footing in the global market and buffered economic interaction between China and the West; China and Hong Kong existed in a balance that held “one country, two systems” as the norm. That all changed in 2020 with China’s passing of the National Security Law, effectively ending the old system and implementing China’s will over Hong Kong in near totality. Where friction between China and other countries has been centered mainly around ethnic and religious lines, the conflict between Beijing and Hong Kong exists on “civic and political values such as civil liberty, rule of law, and democracy” (Lee 68). Because China no longer needs this colony to mediate dealings internationally, it has felt quite comfortable inserting itself into its dealings.

Protests against a Beijing takeover have been happening for years now, coming to their most public head during the 79-day-long Umbrella Movement. Since the implementation of the National Security Law, crackdowns on free speech have continued to be plentiful. Critical discourse surrounding Hong Kong’s history and future still exists, but conversations are often encoded to maintain citizens’ safety.

In the years following the implementation of the National Security Law, Hong Kongers still maintain protest against China in their own ways. Recently, the Hong Kong rugby team entered their game to the tune of a protest song rather than the Chinese national anthem. The death of Queen Elizabeth II sparked public mourning in the city, where gatherings were held in the Queen’s honor outside the British consulate in what must have been a subtle dig at China.

I am very interested to see what direction Hong Kong will be led in the coming years. A commonly held fear by its citizens is that Hong Kong will become just another Chinese city. Even as Hong Kong’s freedoms are being eroded away by the state, I hope to see the will of the people shine through and prevail.

China’s track record concerning their interactions with ethnic minorities is–to say the least–not great. Human rights organizations have long decried the systematic abuses and violence that take place such as Xinjiang and along Tibetan borderlands. Military power is demonstrated to Taiwan on a regular basis. In this post, I will focus less on the physical altercations that occur between people of different ethnicities and the state. Rather, I would like to focus on the programs and information in place that maintains the power of the Chinese state through public opinion.

A population of over 1 billion means it is difficult to determine what “the Chinese” think of the state’s policies regarding ethnic minorities. Knowledge will obviously vary anywhere from ignorance to vehement opposition to abject denial. Generally, official Chinese narratives will emphasize “ethnic harmony,” where denial is policy. Xinjiang is portrayed as a community center of relevant training, culturally sensitive education, and general cooperation. While outside reports will assert the exact opposite, Chinese state media has made a concerted effort to discredit Western media as being anti-China for the sake of being anti-China (which, to be fair, is absolutely true in some cases).

The heavy moderation of Chinese social media makes it difficult to amass unfiltered opinions, however, the social media app “Clubhouse” hosted a “room” in which nearly 4,000 Han Chinese, Uyghurs, and other Chinese and Muslim ethnic minorities were allowed to freely discuss their opinions, tell their stories, and ask questions. While access to this app has since been shut down in Mainland China, this glimpse into the minds of everyday people was enlightening, to say the least. The convention of differing perspectives was short-lived, and there are few other cases like it coming from directly inside mainland China, but this unfiltered view into so many frames of reference was of great importance. Listen to a podcast with some of the room’s hosts here.

This is quite varied from the repetitions of government arguments: that Uyghurs are domestic terrorists, violent, and in need of control. Western pushback has all but firmly planted some in this rhetoric and all willingness to critically examine the government is lost. This is positively fed by state-run media outlets, and the cycle remains unbroken. The general positivity surrounding surveillance, in conjunction with the sentiment that Uyghurs are violent and dangerous, further that exact doctrine in the region of Xinjiang. As noted in a meeting with Dr. Alessandro Rippa, the familiarity imposed on Kashgar–a Uyghur-dominated city– through intense surveillance and a change from traditional architecture to a more familiar, modernized version makes Uyghur culture more palatable and consumable to these Chinese tourists.

Overall, the general sentiments of Chinese citizens are as hard to gather as any other country. Opinions are varied. Free and open communication is difficult. Bias is hard to address. What we can say, however, is that the State is making sure to keep a hard lid on the exact situation of thousands of Uyghur detainees. And they don’t seem keen on letting the pot off any time soon.

China’s lack of soft power is not a secret to most. Where China likes to think of itself in the context of its socialist roots, regionally, the rhetoric is not often mutual. South-South cooperation has little meaning to the democratic West in the context of China’s authoritarianism. Attempts to spread cultural exchange have primarily ended in failure. This back-and-forth has only built greater tension between the West and China, and it seems we are to the point where both parties are sticking their fingers in their ears and ignoring any and all attempts to make nice.

In this context, China’s span of influence might be a double-edged sword. It gains strength in the developing world through energy, infrastructure, and trade deals, but limits itself through its highly-controlled domestic “strongman” appearance. China’s iron hand towards ideological dissidence and political nonconformance is in direct opposition to the soft image it tries to convey. Soft power is hard to measure, but public opinion is a fairly accurate metric by which China can measure its success. And so far, in Southeast Asia where the Chinese diaspora is greatest, things don’t look good.

These attempts to spread influence seem to be hampered by a certain level of fear that China is going to impose its political and cultural power over these countries. It seems that China’s expansion of other forms of power, such as economic statecraft and patron-clientelism, is throttling its expansion of soft power. Perhaps these countries’ fear of economic strangulation or political isolation outweighs cultural admiration or humanitarian progress. China is stuck at a standstill in this region.

Such is not the case in other regions of the world. Where favorability with the United States has fallen, China has come to replace us. Generally, the US is still seen as the most favorable world power. However, our image is quickly falling while perceptions of China’s growing influence are becoming felt worldwide. Will China continue its pursuit of soft power as it has in recent years? Or will its economic power continue to reign as its defining winning characteristic?